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Abstract
The impact of remittances on inequality is uncertain a priori. How-
ever, at the margin, remittances are likely to be more inequality in-
creasing (or less inequality decreasing) in poorer as opposed to richer
areas. This is suggested with a simple theoretical model, and tested
empirically using survey-based estimates of the Gini income elastic-
ity of remittances in Honduras. The results are robust to alternative
distribution weights used for measuring inequality.
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Remittances from abroad are a key source of revenue in many developing
countries, but the impact of remittances on income inequality is unclear.
While some studies suggest that remittances are inequality increasing (e.g.,
Rodr´ ıguez, 1998, and Leones and Feldman, 1998 in the Philippines; Barham
and Boucher, 1998 in Nicaragua; Adger, 1999 in Coastal Viet Nam), others
suggest that they are inequality decreasing (e.g. Ahlburg, 1996 in Tonga;
Handa and King, 1997 in Jamaica).
Theoretically, whether remittances contribute to increasing or decreasing
income inequality depends on who is migrating and remitting. If migrants
come from poorer segments of the population, the impact of their remittances
is more likely to contribute to a reduction in inequality because on average
poorer families are going to receive the extra income from remittances. On
the other hand, if migrants tend to be better oﬀ, remittances are more likely
to be inequality increasing since comparatively richer families will beneﬁt
from the extra income.
A related, but not identical point has been made by Jones (1998) and
Stark et al. (1986). Although none of these authors provide a formal model
of the decision to migrate, they both argue that the impact of remittances
on inequality depends on the stage of migration in the home country or
location. Jones argues that the eﬀect of remittances on the distribution of
income depends on the “stage” of migration in the sending community. He
distinguishes three stages of migration: the “innovative stage”, when only the
most adventurous and better oﬀ people migrate, in which case remittances
tend to be inequality increasing; the “early adopter stage”, when people
from lower segments of the income distribution also start to migrate and,
therefore, remittances become comparatively more inequality decreasing; and
ﬁnally, the “later adopter stage”, when due to the accumulation over time of
remittances in families with migrants, those families are farther apart from
the families without migrants and therefore remittances may be inequality
increasing again. Stark et al. (1986) also ﬁnd that a village’s migration
history, as well as how widespread migration opportunities are, matter for
how remittances aﬀect inequality. They ﬁnd that in a Mexican village with
little migration to the United States, remittances are inequality increasing
while the opposite is true for a village where migration to the United States
has a long history.
In this paper, rather than looking at how the impact of remittances on
2inequality changes with the state of migration, we focus on how this impact
varies according to the income level of the area of origin. We present a simple
two-period model to explain why the impact of remittances on inequality is
uncertain a priori. More precisely, we argue that the impact of remittances on
inequality depends on where those who migrate are located in the distribution
of income. We consider the decision to send migrants for diﬀerent households
within a community. We ﬁnd that, in the general case, neither the poorest
nor the richest households will beneﬁt from migration, and therefore send
some of their members away. The richest people in a community are not
likely to gain from migration because their income is already high, so that it
would be diﬃcult for them to obtain a higher wage by migrating. The reason
why the poorest do not migrate is diﬀerent: they may ﬁnd it too costly, that is
they may not have access to ﬁnancial markets to borrow and pay upfront for
the cost of migration, even though they would beneﬁt more from migration
than other households. Given that neither the very poor nor the very rich
are likely to migrate, the impact of migration on inequality is uncertain. But
it can still be argued on the basis of our model that remittances will tend to
be more inequality increasing (or less inequality decreasing) in poorer areas
than in richer areas.
To make this clear, consider a comparison of the impact of remittances
in urban (i.e., richer) versus rural (i.e., poorer) areas. Since we observe
migration (or rather, remittances) in both types of areas, the families of the
migrant individuals must have had enough income to pay for the cost of
migration, but their income must have been also suﬃciently low so as to
beneﬁt from migration (i.e., the wage at home is lower for the household
member who is migrating than the expected wage upon migration). Assume
that the individuals who migrate to some attractive area within a country
or abroad have similar characteristics whether they are coming from rural or
urban areas. Urban families who have members who migrate are likely to
occupy a lower position in the distribution of income within urban areas than
their rural counterparts. That is, with a similar level of income, the migrants’
families will tend to be comparatively richer in rural areas (when compared
to other rural households), and poorer in urban areas (when compared to
other urban households). Then, the same level of remittances would be
more inequality reducing (or less inequality increasing) in urban than in
rural areas. While this does not mean that remittances will deﬁnitively be
inequality increasing in rural areas, and inequality decreasing in urban areas,
it still permits to assume that comparatively, the impact of remittances in
3both types of areas will be diﬀerent, and predictably so.
To test our model empirically, we use recent data from a nationally repre-
sentative survey for Honduras. Using the methodology developed by Lerman
and Yitzhaki (1985) and Stark et al. (1986), we estimate the impact of re-
mittances on the Gini coeﬃcient and ﬁnd that at the margin, remittances
tend indeed to be more inequality reducing (or less inequality increasing) in
urban than in rural areas. While the net impact on inequality at the margin
of remittances is sensitive to the choice of the measure of inequality (i.e.,
extended Gini versus standard Gini), the ﬁnding that remittances are more
inequality reducing (or less inequality increasing) in urban than in rural areas
remains robust when using the extended Gini instead of the standard Gini.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
theoretical model, section 3 presents the empirical results using the data
from Honduras and section 4 brieﬂy summarizes our ﬁndings and presents
conclusions.
2 Model
Consider a family with two possible sources of income, namely the wage from
a young son (or daughter) and the wage from an older parent. We allow only
the son to migrate. For simplicity, we provide a two-period model, but an
extension to more than two periods would be straightforward. The family
is considered as a single economic agent whose utility depends on today’s
consumption, c0, as well as the present value of consumption in period two
for the parent (and the other family members who do not migrate), cp, and
for the son, cs, who may or may not migrate depending on the opportunities
provided by migration. The family’s utility function is separable, so that:
U(c0,cp,cs) = u(c0) + β
£
V (cp) + W(cs)
¤
. (1)
where β is the discounting factor and u(·), V (·) and W(·) are continuously
increasing concave functions. Let
lim
x→0u(x) = −∞ lim
x→0V (x) = −∞ lim
x→0W(x) = −∞.
That is, zero consumption for the family as a whole in the ﬁrst period (when
all family members are living together) or for either the parent (and the other
4members remaining at home) or the son in the second period yields inﬁnite
disutility.
In the ﬁrst period, the parent works and receives a wage of w. If the son
also works, he receives the same wage. If the son migrates, he does not earn
a wage in the ﬁrst period, and the family has to pay the cost of migration
c. In the second period, the son receives a wage wm. The total cost of
migrating is the sum of the direct cost c and the forgone income for the ﬁrst
period w. The cost c is assumed to be the same for all families. The wage at
the host location, wm, can be considered as the expected wage of migrants
before migrating. Empirically, we might ﬁnd a positive correlation between
the wages at home and at the host location for each individual, but in order
to make the model as simple as possible, we will assume that the wage at
the host location is the same (i.e., constant) for all migrants. Our results do
not depend on this assumption.
Markets are assumed to be incomplete, so that the family cannot borrow
money in the ﬁrst period to help one of its members to migrate. The price of
consumption, both present and future, is normalized to 1. If the son migrates
in the ﬁrst period, he remits a proportion α of his earnings to help his parent
in future periods, unless w ≥ wm, in which case α is zero (the son remits
only if the parent and other household members at home are worse oﬀ than
himself). If the son does not migrate, α is also equal to zero since the parent
and the son have the same income and there is no reason for them to shift
consumption from one to the other. The constraints for the optimization
problem are:
c0 = 2w − ξ(w + c) (2)
cp = w + ξ(αwm) (3)




1 if the son migrates
0 if the son does not migrate.
(5)









5As it usually happens when altruism is assumed as we do here, the amount
of remittances sent by the son is lower when the parent’s wage is higher.
Since the son cares about the parent well-being, as the income of the parent
increases, the marginal utility for the son is lower and he spends less on the
parent (see for example Becker, 1974).
To decide whether the son should migrate, the family estimates the gain
from migration:
G(w) =u(w − c) − u(2w)
+ β
£







Migration will take place only when G(w) ≥ 0.
The impact of migration and remittances on income inequality depends on
whom migrates. Let the income of the parents be distributed over an interval
[w, ¯ w] according to a continuous cumulative distribution function, F(·). If
c is very large, or wm is low enough or both, we may have no migration at
all. In a more realistic setting, unless c is very low, some families with very
low income will probably choose not to migrate. This is because for very
low wages, G(w) < 0, since as the wage approaches the cost of migration,
the utility becomes minus inﬁnity.1 Without loss of generality, let G(w) < 0.
That is, the lowest wage is suﬃciently close to the cost of migration, so people
with that wage will not migrate. At the other extreme of the distribution
of income, if some families enjoy a wage at home higher than the wage they
can expect under migration, so that ¯ w > wm, they will also choose not to
migrate. Since both G(w) and G( ¯ w) are negative, there are an even number
of times that G(·) = 0.
If migration is observed, we will assume for simplicity that there are only
two wage levels for which G(·) = 0, in which case there are three diﬀerent
groups of families. The ﬁrst group consists of families who do not migrate
because their income is too low. For these families, the present disutility from
the cost of migration outweighs future beneﬁts, even though the expected
wage gain from migration is the highest for these families. In ﬁgure 1, all
families with parental wage lower than w− belong to this group. Note that,
since u(·) is concave, as the wage at home increases, u(2w)−u(w−c) becomes
smaller, and it is more likely that the son will migrate. The second group
of families is the one for which migration is a rational choice. This group
1limx→c+ u(x − c) = −∞.
6is represented in ﬁgure 1 by the families with parental wage in the segment
[w−,w+]. Note that since G(w+) = 0, then:
u(2w
+) − u(w















Since α(w+) is optimally chosen and the left hand side of (8) is positive,
w+ < wm, for otherwise α = 0 and (8) would not hold.
Finally, for families with high wages, the future beneﬁts of migration are
low or even negative if w ≥ wm.2 All families with parental income higher
that w+ in ﬁgure 1 are in this case. Since w+ < wm, some families with
migrants could have more income in future periods than families for whom
the gains from migration are negative because their income at home is high,







Figure 1: Gains from migration for diﬀerent paternal incomes.
Thus only families in the second group (wages in [w−,w+]) are aﬀected
by migration. For these families, the total income after migration, i.e. the
2Actually even for lower wages the gains from migration would be negative since they
have to pay the costs of migration.
7sum of the wages earned by the father and the son, is larger than without
migration. Since the proportion of total income in the hands of the other two
other groups is lower after migration, the Lorenz curve after migration will
cross the Lorenz curve before migration as shown in ﬁgure 2. The impact
of migration on inequality is uncertain, and inequality measures such as the
Gini index may increase or decrease due to migration. For migration to
be inequality decreasing with certainty, we must have w− < w, in which
case even the poorest families will migrate. The other extreme case is when
¯ w < w+, in which case the Lorenz curve after migration would lie below the
Lorenz curve before migration took place, and income inequality increases.
Note that a decrease in the migration costs or an increase in the wages abroad
would make migration more likely for both poorer and richer families.3
Although we cannot say a priori if migration is inequality increasing or
decreasing, we can say that migration will tend to be more inequality in-
creasing (or less inequality decreasing) in geographic areas where wages are
low than in areas where wages are high. In poor areas, the cost of migra-
tion represents more of a burden for the poor, so that a larger proportion
of the poor will not migrate. Additionally, in poor areas, since wages are
lower, the proportion of the richer population that will not migrate will be
smaller. In richer areas, those who are comparatively poorer will be more
likely to migrate because the cost of migration will not be such a barrier,
and a higher proportion of the rich will not migrate because they will be less
likely to gain from migration. For example, one would expect migration to
be more inequality increasing (or less inequality decreasing) in rural than in
urban areas.
In a typical household survey, and in the empirical work presented in the
following section, we do not observe the income of those who have migrated
(i.e., the migrant is considered as a separate household in the survey.) But
for all households, we have information on various income sources, including
3This could well happen according to Jones (1998) who suggests that as migration
becomes more prominent in a community, networks begin to develop, and this may cause
the costs of migration to fall. Indeed, in Jone’s innovative stage, there is little information
about the opportunities abroad apart from the fact that the costs are high. By contrast,
in the early adopter stage, networks have formed, thereby reducing the costs of migration.
Information about opportunities abroad is also better, leading more people to migrate.
In the later adopter stage, the costs and the information don’t change, but the diﬀerence
in incomes between the families who have engaged in migration for some time and those






Lorenz curve before migration
Lorenz curve after migration
Figure 2: Lorenz curves before and after migration takes place.
remittances received from household members who have migrated. Since
we do not observe the wage of the migrants, the families with one or more
migrants may drop a bit in the distribution of income (as compared to what
we would observe if we were able to include the wage of the migrants) when
compared with families without migrants, because for the later we do observe
the wages of all family members. There will also be some overlap in the
observed incomes for families with and without migrants. Still, a standard
cross-sectional survey can be used for testing the main prediction of our
model. Indeed, it will still remain true despite limitations in the data that
families with migrants will not in most cases belong to the very poor or the
very rich, and that remittances will be more inequality increasing (or less
inequality decreasing) in rural or poorer than in urban or richer areas.
93 Empirical Results
This section provides an empirical test of the prediction of our model, namely
that remittances are more inequality decreasing in urban areas than in ru-
ral areas. We use data from Honduras’ March 1999 Encuesta Permanente
de Hogares de Prop´ ositos M´ ultiples (EPHPM), a nationally representative
survey comprising of about 7,200 households, stratiﬁed into four geographic
regions: the capital of Tegucigalpa, the city of San Pedro Sula, other ur-
ban areas, and rural areas. About half the population lives in rural areas.
The income sources which are recorded in the survey are: wage earnings
from a primary or secondary occupation; earnings from self-employment in-
come; pensions; subsidies (this may include subsidies for electricity and ur-
ban transportation, which are fairly large and do not reach the poor well);
rents (probably from houses or apartments); transfers (“bonos” in Spanish;
again it is not fully clear from the questionnaire what is covered, but pro-
grams providing cash stipends for children attending schools enters in this
category); remittances from abroad; income support from family members,
income support from other individuals; and other income sources.
A ﬁrst way to assess whether remittances are inequality increasing or
decreasing is to compute the Gini index with and without remittances from
abroad. If the Gini is higher (lower) with remittances, it can be argued that
remittances are inequality increasing (decreasing). While we provide such
results, an alternative and more interesting way to assess whether remittances
are inequality increasing or decreasing is to compute the marginal impact on
inequality of a slightly higher level of remittances, for example following an
increase in the level of wages abroad in our model. For this, we use the
decomposition of the Gini proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). Denote
total per capita income by y, the cumulative distribution function of per
capita income by F(y), and the mean per capita income across all households








where Gy is the Gini index for total income, Gi is the Gini index for income
yi from source i, Si = µi/¯ y is the share of total income obtained from source
i, and Ri is the Gini correlation between income from source i and total
income. The Gini correlation is deﬁned as Ri = cov[yi,F(y)]/cov[(yi,F(yi)],
where F(yi) is the cumulative distribution function of per capita income from
10source i. The Gini correlation Ri can take values between −1 and 1. Income
from sources such as income from capital which tend to be strongly and
positively correlated with total income typically have large positive Gini cor-
relations. Income from other sources may have smaller, and possibly negative
Gini correlations. The value SiRiGi is the so-called absolute contribution of
the income source to inequality, but we are interested more in the source’s
marginal contribution. As proven by Stark et al. (1986), the impact of in-
creasing for all households the income from a given income source i in such
a way that yi is multiplied by (1 + ei) where ei tends to zero is:
∂Gy
∂ei
= Si(RiGi − Gy) (10)
The percentage change in inequality due to a marginal percentage change
in the income from source i is equal to that source’s contribution to the Gini
minus its contribution to total income. In other words, at the marginal
level, what matters for evaluating the impact of income sources is not their
Gini, but rather the product RiGi which is called the pseudo Gini. Denoting
by ηi = RiGi/Gy the so-called Gini elasticity of income for source i, the
marginal impact of a percentage change in income from source i identical for







− Si = Si(ηi − 1) (11)
An increase in income from a source with a Gini elasticity ηi smaller
(larger) than one will decrease (increase) the inequality in per capita income
at the margin. The lower the Gini elasticity, the larger the redistributive
impact.
Table 1 provides the empirical results obtained for the standard Gini in
Honduras at the national, urban, and rural levels. The bottom part of the
table provides the comparison of the Gini index with and without remittances
from abroad. Nationally and in urban areas, including remittances in total
per capita income reduces inequality, while there is virtually no impact in
rural areas. This is what our model predicted (i.e., more inequality reduction
in urban or richer as opposed to rural or poorer areas).
The table also provides estimates of the absolute and marginal contribu-
tions to inequality of the various income sources. The ﬁrst column in the table
11provides the share of total per capita income accounted by each source. For
example, wage earnings from a primary occupation represent 46.1 percent of
total income nationally, as compared with 2.2 percent for wage earnings from
a secondary occupation, and 40.2 percent for earnings from self-employment.
Remittances from abroad, support from family members, and income from
rents account for, respectively, 4.6, 3.7, and 1.7 percent of total income at
the national level. All other income sources represent less than one per-
cent of total per capita income. The situation is broadly similar in urban
and rural areas taken separately, although (not surprisingly) income from
self-employment plays a much larger role in rural areas.
The second and third columns in the table provide the Gini indices and the
Gini correlations of the various income sources. The absolute contribution
of a source to inequality (in column four) is the product of the source’s share
in total income, its Gini, and its Gini correlation. Because the income shares
of wages from a primary occupation and self-employment income are largest,
these are also the income sources with the largest absolute contribution to
income inequality.
At the margin by contrast, whether the contribution of a source to in-
equality is positive or negative depends only on the source’s Gini income
elasticity, which is the product of the source’s Gini index and Gini correla-
tion divided by the overall Gini. As explained earlier, a percentage increase
in the income from a source with a Gini income elasticity smaller (larger)
than one will decrease (increase) the inequality in per capita income. The
lower the Gini elasticity, the larger the redistributive impact of an income
source. The ﬁndings for the Gini elasticities suggest for example that sub-
sidies increase inequality, in part because the goods which are subsidized
(such as electricity) tend to be consumed more by the non-poor than by the
poor (for an evaluation of electricity subsidies in Honduras, see Wodon et
al., 2002).
For our purpose, the main interest lies in the ﬁndings for the impact of
remittances from abroad on inequality. In rural areas, the Gini elasticity
for remittances is larger than one (1.385), so that remittances from abroad
are inequality increasing. In urban areas, the elasticity is smaller than one
(0.956), so that remittances are mildly inequality decreasing. Nationally,
remittances are inequality increasing at the margin (elasticity of 1.136). The
ﬁndings are thus as predicted by our simple theoretical model: remittances
tend to be more inequality reducing (or less inequality increasing) in urban
(or richer) as opposed to rural (or poorer) areas.
12These result could however be sensitive to the distribution weights im-
plicit in the use of the standard Gini index for the measurement of inequality.
In order to test for this sensitivity, we apply the decomposition by income





The standard Gini corresponds to ν = 2. A higher (lower) value for ν
implies a higher emphasis on the lower (upper) part of the distribution of
income. The absolute and marginal contributions of remittances from abroad
to inequality can be computed in a very similar way to that shown above for
the standard Gini. The results are provided in table 2. The extended Gini
indices with remittances remain smaller than those without remittances at
the national and urban level, while in rural areas, for all practical purposes,
including remittances in the income aggregate still does not aﬀect inequality
much. When a higher weight is placed on the poor (ν = 6), remittances
from abroad become inequality increasing at the margin everywhere, which is
not surprising in light of the ﬁnancial constraints to international migration
for the very poor. Still, the fact that at the margin, remittances tend to
be comparatively more inequality reducing (or less inequality increasing) in
urban than in rural areas remains robust with the extended Gini.
4 Conclusion
We have provided a simple model to suggest that although the impact of
migration and remittances on inequality is uncertain a priori, we expect the
impact to be comparatively more inequality decreasing (or less inequality
increasing) in richer than in poorer areas. Using recent data from Hon-
duras, the prediction of the model was conﬁrmed by comparing the impact
of international remittances on income inequality in urban (i.e., richer) and
rural (i.e., poorer) areas. Our ﬁndings could be especially important in a
social welfare framework based on relative deprivation theory. According to
this theory, which can be formalized by using the extended Gini index of
inequality (e.g., Yitzhaki, 1983), households or families assess their level of
welfare not only in absolute terms, but also in comparison with their peers
or comparison group. In developing countries, it is likely that a household’s
comparison group will be at least in part based on geographic location. That
13is, rural/urban households may compare themselves to other rural/urban
households. In poorer and rural areas where levels of social welfare tend to
be lower, part of the expected positive impact of international migration on
total family income may be oﬀset by a higher level of income inequality at
home. This would not be observed, or at least not observed to the same
extent, in urban areas. More generally, independently of an interpretation
of our ﬁndings in a relative deprivation framework, the paper does provide a
simple theoretical model, and an empirical validation, as to why the impact
of remittances on income inequality may vary depending on location within
a country, or the country itself.
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15Table 1: Decomposition by source of standard Gini for per capita income, March 1999, Honduras.
National Urban Rural
Share Gini Cor. Abs. Elas. Share Gini Cor. Abs. Elas. Share Gini Cor. Abs. Elas.
Sk Gk Rk SkGkRk
RkGk
G Sk Gk Rk SkGkRk
RkGk
G Sk Gk Rk SkGkRk
RkGk
G
Primary wage 0.461 0.713 0.767 0.252 0.978 0.513 0.627 0.720 0.231 0.913 0.352 0.727 0.667 0.171 0.901
Secondary wage 0.022 0.977 0.654 0.014 1.142 0.020 0.981 0.748 0.014 1.487 0.027 0.968 0.610 0.016 1.097
Self employment 0.402 0.771 0.723 0.224 0.997 0.349 0.790 0.683 0.188 1.093 0.513 0.726 0.768 0.286 1.036
Public transfers 0.008 0.993 0.739 0.006 1.313 0.008 0.990 0.639 0.005 1.282 0.007 0.996 0.815 0.005 1.507
Subsidies 0.001 0.997 0.777 0.001 1.385 0.001 0.992 0.589 0.000 1.183 0.001 1.000 0.925 0.001 1.718
Rents 0.017 0.989 0.816 0.014 1.442 0.023 0.980 0.752 0.017 1.494 0.004 0.995 0.620 0.003 1.145
Transfers 0.003 0.995 0.687 0.002 1.222 0.003 0.995 0.722 0.002 1.455 0.004 0.995 0.709 0.003 1.312
Remittances 0.046 0.964 0.659 0.029 1.136 0.045 0.947 0.498 0.021 0.956 0.047 0.977 0.763 0.035 1.385
Private transfers
Family 0.037 0.939 0.443 0.015 0.743 0.035 0.935 0.346 0.011 0.656 0.040 0.935 0.431 0.016 0.749
Individuals 0.001 0.998 0.315 0.000 0.562 0.001 0.998 0.395 0.000 0.799 0.001 0.997 0.116 0.000 0.215
Other income 0.003 0.998 0.677 0.002 1.207 0.003 0.998 0.697 0.002 1.410 0.004 0.997 0.611 0.002 1.132
Gini 0.559 0.494 0.538
Gini without
remittances 0.566 0.506 0.538
Source: Autors’ estimation using March 1999 EHPHM.
1
6Table 2: Sensitivity of results to distribution weights in the Gini index
Comparison of extended Gini Marginal impacts
with and without remittances Gini income
National Urban Rural elasticities
With Without With Without With Without National Urban Rural
ν=1.5 0.398 0.404 0.348 0.357 0.382 0.382 1.097 0.899 1.454
ν=2 0.559 0.566 0.494 0.506 0.538 0.538 1.136 0.956 1.385
ν=4 0.773 0.779 0.696 0.713 0.754 0.755 1.143 1.060 1.225
ν=6 0.843 0.848 0.768 0.785 0.829 0.831 1.118 1.084 1.158
Source: Autors’ estimation using March 1999 EHPHM.
17